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In October 2001, the first inhalational anthrax case in the United States since 1976 was identified in a
media company worker in Florida. A national investigation was initiated to identify additional cases and
determine possible exposures to Bacillus anthracis. Surveillance was enhanced through health-care facili-
ties, laboratories, and other means to identify cases, which were defined as clinically compatible illness
with laboratory-confirmed B. anthracis infection. From October 4 to November 20, 2001, 22 cases of
anthrax (11 inhalational, 11 cutaneous) were identified; 5 of the inhalational cases were fatal. Twenty
(91%) case-patients were either mail handlers or were exposed to worksites where contaminated mail was
processed or received. B. anthracis isolates from four powder-containing envelopes, 17 specimens from
patients, and 106 environmental samples were indistinguishable by molecular subtyping. Illness and death
occurred not only at targeted worksites, but also along the path of mail and in other settings. Continued
vigilance for cases is needed among health-care providers and members of the public health and law
enforcement communities.
n the United States, Bacillus anthracis infections have pri-
marily occurred through exposure to infected animals or
contaminated animal products such as wool (1). Cases of
anthrax have been reported infrequently since the 1970s; the
last reported case of inhalational anthrax in the United States
occurred in 1976, and the last reported case of cutaneous
anthrax occurred in the summer of 2001 (2,3). Outbreaks of
inhalational anthrax among humans were linked to occupa-
tional exposures at a goat-hair–processing plant in New
Hampshire in 1957 and suspected accidental release of B.
anthracis aerosols from a bioweapons facility in Sverdlovsk,
Russia, in 1979 (4,5). Human cases also have occurred in asso-
ciation with large epidemics of anthrax among animals.
Because the bacteria can persist for long periods of time as a
spore and can be prepared in a powdered formulation, B.
anthracis has been considered a serious biological threat, with
potential use as a military or terrorist weapon (6). 
After terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon in 2001, envelopes containing B. anthracis spores
were mailed to news media companies and government offi-
cials, leading to the first bioterrorism-related cases of anthrax
in the United States. We report the combined findings from the
epidemiologic and laboratory investigations of these cases,
conducted through coordinated efforts of medical and labora-
tory communities and local, state, and federal public health
and law enforcement agencies.
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Methods
Investigators from public health and law enforcement at the
federal, state, and local levels collaborated to identify possible
cases of anthrax, describe case and exposure characteristics,
and prevent further cases through public health interventions.
We classified cases as confirmed or suspected on the basis of
laboratory and clinical findings (7). A confirmed case of
anthrax was defined as clinically compatible illness (cutaneous,
inhalational, or gastrointestinal) that was either 1) laboratory
confirmed by isolation of B. anthracis from a patient’s clinical
specimens, or 2) associated with other laboratory evidence of
B. anthracis infection based on at least two supportive tests. A
suspected case of anthrax was defined as a clinically compati-
ble illness with no alternative diagnosis and no isolation of B.
anthracis, but with either 1) laboratory evidence of B. anthracis
by one supportive laboratory test or 2) an epidemiologic link to
an environmental B. anthracis exposure. 
Laboratory criteria for the case definition of anthrax were
1) isolation of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen from a
patient’s affected tissue or site, with confirmation by direct flu-
orescent-antibody staining and gamma phage lysis (8); or 2)
other supportive laboratory tests, including a) evidence of B.
anthracis DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from
specimens from a patient’s affected tissue or site, b) demon-
stration of B. anthracis in a clinical specimen by immunohis-
tochemical staining (IHC), or c) positive serologic testing by
an investigational enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) that determined the concentration of serum immuno-
globulin G (IgG) to the protective antigen (PA) component of
anthrax toxin; sera were considered reactive if antibody was
neutralized by competitive inhibition (9,10).
Case finding was initiated by local, state, and federal pub-
lic health agencies in all 50 U.S. states and through govern-
ment agencies in other countries. Hospital- and clinic-based
surveillance for possible cases of inhalational anthrax in
selected regions was done by provider-based reporting and
medical record review of patients seen in emergency depart-
ments, intensive-care units, and outpatient clinics and in con-
sultation with dermatologists and other medical specialists.
Surveillance was also conducted among medical examiners
and at affected news media, government, and postal work-
places. Various electronic communication networks of infec-
tious disease physicians, dermatologists, infection control
professionals, emergency department physicians, laboratori-
ans, and others were used to increase awareness among practi-
tioners to recognize and report possible cases of anthrax. Case
definitions and characteristics, diagnostic and treatment infor-
mation, and other findings were communicated through the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)’s Morbid-
ity and Mortality Weekly Report, Epidemic Information
Exchange, and Health Alert Network.
Investigators responded to reports of possible cases from
clinicians, law enforcement officials, and the general public.
Possible case-patients or exposed persons were interviewed
with site-specific data collection forms. Public health laborato-
ries tested clinical specimens, powder-containing envelopes,
and environmental samples for the presence of B. anthracis.
Demographic data, clinical presentation, exposure risk infor-
mation, preliminary clinical and environmental laboratory test
results, and other findings were collected. Reports of cases
meeting the surveillance case definition were forwarded to
CDC.
The multistate investigation was conducted by state and
local health departments in collaboration with CDC and was
coordinated through CDC’s Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). The EOC, which used an incident command system
structure, was organized into teams of epidemiologists, labora-
torians, environmental scientists, communication specialists,
and logisticians. EOC teams supported local, state, and federal
public health investigators in Florida, New York City, New
Jersey, the District of Columbia metropolitan area, and Con-
necticut. A separate EOC team served as a liaison to state
health departments and laboratories. Teams also coordinated
interactions with the U.S. Postal Service, Department of
Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other federal
agencies and organizations. Intervention teams were initiated
to coordinate environmental monitoring and decontamination,
postexposure prophylaxis and vaccination, and deployment of
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile program assets. Reports of
cases and environmental sampling, updates of interventions,
and other activities were communicated to the EOC for coordi-
nating the investigation and for communications with federal
and state partners, and the media. 
Environmental investigations were performed at sites pos-
sibly contaminated with B. anthracis spores to assess the pres-
ence and extent of contamination and to guide
decontamination and environmental remediation. Environ-
mental samples at news media and postal facilities, residences,
and other sites were taken by surface sampling with swabs,
wipes, HEPA vacuum filtration, and air sampling (11,12).
Nasal swab specimens were collected to define the area of
exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis and ascertain where a
person with inhalational anthrax might have been exposed.
Because the sensitivity of nasal swab cultures wanes, attempts
were made to obtain cultures within 7 days of exposure. The
presence of B. anthracis from nasal swab cultures was not
determined by Gram stain or colony characteristics alone but
required confirmatory testing by qualified laboratories. 
Environmental samples were collected by public health,
law enforcement, and contract staff and were tested at labora-
tories participating with the local, state, and federal investiga-
tion efforts. Suspect culture colonies were screened by
standard Laboratory Response Network Level A testing proce-
dures for identification of B. anthracis and confirmed by stan-
dard Level B procedures, such as direct fluorescent-antibody
staining and gamma phage lysis (8,13). Antimicrobial suscep-
tibility patterns were determined for selected B. anthracis iso-
lates by National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards
(NCCLS) MIC breakpoints for staphylococci (14). NCCLS
has not defined either a B. anthracis or staphylococcal inter-Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1021
BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
pretive breakpoint for ceftriaxone; thus, breakpoints for gram-
negative organisms were used to interpret ceftriaxone results.
Isolates of B. anthracis recovered from clinical specimens,
environmental samples, and powder-containing envelopes
were subtyped to show genetic relationships by multiple-locus
variable-number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) (15). Statisti-
cal analysis of epidemiologic data to calculate measures of
association was performed by using EpiInfo (CDC, Atlanta,
GA) and SAS (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). 
Results
From October 2 to November 20, 2001, investigators iden-
tified 22 cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax; 11 were con-
firmed as inhalational anthrax and 11 (7 confirmed and 4
Table 1. Demographic, clinical, and exposure characteristics of 22 cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax, United States, 2001
Case no.
Onset 
date, 2001
Date of anthrax 
diagnosis by lab 
testing Statea
Age 
(yrs) Sexa Racea Occupationa Case statusb
Anthrax 
presentationb Outcome Diagnostic testsa
1 9/22 10/19 NY 31 F W NY Post 
employee
Suspect Cutaneous Alive Serum IgG reactive
2 9/25 10/12 NY 38 F W NBC anchor 
assistant
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+ / 
serum IgG reactive
3 9/26 10/18 NJ 39 M W USPS machine 
mechanic
Suspect Cutaneous Alive Serum IgG reactive
4 9/28 10/15 FL 73 M W, H AMI mailroom 
worker
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Pleural biopsy IHC+ / 
serum IgG reactive
5 9/28 10/18 NJ 45 F W USPS mail car-
rier
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+ and 
PCR+ / serum IgG reac.
6 9/28 10/12 NY 23 F W NBC TV news 
intern
Suspect Cutaneous Alive Serum IgG reactive
7 9/29 10/15 NY 0.6 M W Child of ABC 
employee
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+ / 
blood PCR+
8 9/30 10/4 FL 63 M W AMI photo 
editor
Confirmed Inhalational Dead Cerebrospinal fluid 
culture +
9 10/1 10/18 NY 27 F W CBS anchor 
assistant
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+ / serum 
IgG reactive
10 10/14 10/19 PA 35 M W USPS mail 
processor
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Blood culture + / serum 
IgG reactive
11 10/14 10/28 NJ 56 F B USPS mail 
processor
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Blood PCR+ / pleural 
fluid cytology IHC+ / 
serum IgG reactive
12 10/15 10/29 NJ 43 F A USPS mail 
processor
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Pleural fluid IHC+ / 
bronchial biopsy IHC+ / 
serum IgG reactive
13 10/16 10/21 VA 56 M B USPS mail 
worker
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Blood culture +
14 10/16 10/23 MD 55 M B USPS mail 
worker
Confirmed Inhalational Dead Blood culture +
15 10/16 10/26 MD 47 M B USPS mail 
worker
Confirmed Inhalational Dead Blood culture +
16 10/16 10/22 MD 56 M B USPS mail 
worker
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Blood culture +
17 10/17 10/29 NJ 51 F W Bookkeeper Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+ 
and PCR+ / serum IgG 
reactive
18 10/19 10/22 NY 34 M W, H NY Post mail 
handler
Suspect Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy IHC+
19 10/22 10/25 VA 59 M W Government 
mail processor
Confirmed Inhalational Alive Blood culture +
20 10/23 10/28 NY 38 M W NY Post 
employee
Confirmed Cutaneous Alive Skin biopsy culture +
21 10/25 10/30 NY 61 F A Hospital supply 
worker 
Confirmed Inhalational Dead Pleural fluid and 
blood culture +
22 11/14 11/21 CT 94 F W Retired at home Confirmed Inhalational Dead Blood culture +
aNY, New York; FL, Florida; NJ, New Jersey; PA, Pennsylvania; VA, Virginia; DC, District of Columbia; MD, Maryland; CT, Connecticut; F, female; M, male; W, white; B, black; A, 
Asian; W,H, white with Hispanic ethnicity; NBC, National Broadcasting Company; AMI, American Media Inc.; USPS, United States Postal Service; CBS, Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; IHC, immunohistochemical staining; + positive; IgG, immunoglobulin G.
bCase status and anthrax presentation are described in the anthrax surveillance case definition in the Methods section.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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suspected) as cutaneous anthrax. The demographic, clinical,
and exposure characteristics of each patient are presented in
Table 1. In March 2002, an additional case of cutaneous
anthrax was reported in a laboratory worker processing envi-
ronmental samples of B. anthracis in support of the CDC
investigation of the fall 2001 bioterrorism-related anthrax
attacks (16).
Characteristics of Case-Patients
Cases were identified in residents of seven states along the
east coast of the United States: Connecticut, one case; Florida,
two cases; Maryland, three; New Jersey, five; New York City,
eight (includes a case in a New Jersey resident exposed in New
York City); Pennsylvania, one; and Virginia, two. The median
age of patients was 46 years (range 7 months to 94 years)
(Table 2). Patients with inhalational anthrax were older than
those with cutaneous disease (56 vs. 35 years, p<0.01). Twelve
(55%) patients were male; 15 (68%) were white. Five (23%)
case-patients died; deaths occurred only in patients with inha-
lational anthrax. The case-fatality ratio for inhalational anthrax
was 45%. For six cases of inhalational anthrax in postal work-
ers, we were able to estimate the date of first exposure to B.
anthracis–positive envelopes processed with high-speed sort-
ers. The mean duration between exposure and onset of symp-
toms of inhalational anthrax in these patients was 4.5 days
(range 4–6). 
All 11 cases of inhalational anthrax met the surveillance
definition for a confirmed case; 8 were confirmed by isolation
of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen—7 from blood and 1
from cerebrospinal fluid (Table 1). Supportive laboratory tests
used to confirm three other cases of inhalational anthrax
included IHC or PCR of tissues (pleural biopsy, pleural fluid,
or blood) and elevation between acute- and convalescent-
phase serum anti-PA IgG by ELISA (9). 
Seven (64%) of the 11 cases of cutaneous anthrax met the
surveillance definition for a confirmed case; 2 were confirmed
by isolation of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen, 1 from
blood and 1 from a wound (Table 1). Supportive laboratory
tests used in the remaining five confirmed cutaneous cases
included IHC or PCR of skin biopsies, PCR of blood, and ele-
vation of serum anti-PA IgG by ELISA. Four cutaneous cases
each had only one supportive laboratory test for B. anthracis
infection and were classified as suspected: one case had a pos-
itive IHC of a skin biopsy, and three had elevated serum anti-
PA IgG by ELISA. Among cutaneous anthrax cases, lesions
were distributed on the face, arms, or chest; two cases had
multiple lesions.
We classified patients into two broad exposure categories
on the basis of their primary job duties (Table 2). Twelve
(55%) patients (8 with inhalational and 4 with cutaneous dis-
ease) were mail handlers, including U.S. Postal Service
employees (9 cases), government mail processing staff
(1case), and media company mailroom workers (2 cases). Six
(27%) patients (one inhalational and five cutaneous cases)
were media company employees working at sites where pow-
der-containing mail was received: American Media, Inc.
(AMI), one case; Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), one
case; National Broadcasting Company (NBC), two cases; and
New York Post, two cases. Four (18%) case-patients (two
inhalational and two cutaneous cases) were classified as
“other,” including a 7-month-old visitor to the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC), a 61-year-old Manhattan hos-
pital supply room worker, a 51-year-old bookkeeper from New
Jersey, and a 94-year-old Connecticut resident. For analysis,
we excluded case-patients in the “other” category and com-
pared mail handlers with targeted mail recipients. Mail han-
dlers were older (p<0.01) and were associated with
inhalational disease (odds ratio [OR] 10; 95% confidence
intervals [CI] 0.65 < OR < 530.48; p=0.13). Whether age or
occupation were important independent factors in becoming
infected is unknown. Of all 22 patients, 20 (91%) either han-
dled mail potentially contaminated with B. anthracis spores or
were exposed to worksites where B. anthracis–contaminated
mail was processed or received.
Table 2. Comparison of inhalational and cutaneous bioterrorism-related anthrax cases, United States, 2001
Case characteristic All cases,  n=22 (%) Inhalational cases n=11, (%) Cutaneous cases n=11, (%) p value (inhal. vs. cutan.)
Median age (range), yearsa 46 (0.6–94) 56 (43–94) 35 (0.6–51) <0.01
Male sex (percent) 12 (55) 7 (64) 5 (45) 0.7
Occupation/exposure sitea
  Mail handler 12 (55) 8 (73) 4 (36) 0.13
  Media company employees 6 (27) 1 (9) 5 (45)
  Other 4 (18) 2 (18) 2 (18)
No./deaths (case-fatality ratio) 5 (23) 5 (45) 0 (0) 0.04
No. of cases following contaminated lettersb
  September 18 mailing 11 (50) 2 (18) 9 (81) <0.01
  October 9 mailing 8 (36) 7 (64) 1 (9)
aAssociations suggest that age and occupation varied between inhalational and cutaneous cases; however, it is uncertain if age or occupation were significant independent factors for 
having a case of anthrax. Wilcoxon two-sample test for nonparametric data was used. All other measurements used two-sided Fisher’s exact test.
bBased on documented or presumed paths of contaminated envelopes; excludes three case-patients who could not be linked to a particular mailing.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1023
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Clinical and Environmental Laboratory Findings
B. anthracis isolates were collected from four powder-con-
taining envelopes, 17 clinical specimens from case-patients,
and 106 environmental samples collected along the mail path
of the implicated envelopes in Florida, District of Columbia
metropolitan area, New Jersey, New York City, and Connecti-
cut. We compared these isolates by MLVA for molecular typ-
ing and found that all isolates tested were indistinguishable
(17,18). Isolates also had the same antimicrobial susceptibility
patterns (18): all isolates tested were susceptible to penicillin
(MIC range <0.06 µg/mL–0.12 µg/mL), amoxicillin (MIC
<0.06 µg/mL), ciprofloxacin (MIC <0.06 µg/mL), doxycy-
cline (MIC <0.03 µg/mL), chloramphenicol (MIC 4 µg/mL),
clindamycin (MIC <0.5 µg/mL), tetracycline (MIC 0.06 µg/
mL), rifampin (MIC <0.5 µg/mL), clarithromycin (MIC 0.25
µg/mL), and vancomycin (MIC 1–2 µg/mL). Isolates were
borderline susceptible to azithromycin (MIC 2 µg/mL) and
intermediate to erythromycin (MIC 1 µg/mL) and ceftriaxone
(MIC 16) (19).
Assessment of Exposures
Onsets of symptoms occurred from September 22 to
November 14, 2001 (Figure 1). Two distinct case clusters were
separated in time; no cases occurred during a 13-day period
between clusters. One case of inhalational anthrax in a resident
of Connecticut occurred 20 days after the second case cluster. 
Envelopes Containing Spores
Four B. anthracis–positive powder-containing envelopes
were recovered, and the path of the envelopes through the mail
was traced (Figure 2). All four envelopes were standard, pres-
tamped U.S. Postal Service issue. Two of the four envelopes,
one addressed to NBC news anchor Tom Brokaw and the other
to the editor of the New York Post, both in New York City,
were mailed in or around Trenton, New Jersey, and were post-
marked September 18, 2001. Both these envelopes contained
letters with the phrases, “09-11-01…This is next…Take pena-
cilin [sic] now…” (20). The next two envelopes recovered,
one addressed to Senator Tom Daschle and one to Senator
Patrick Leahy, both in Washington, D.C., were mailed in or
around Trenton and were postmarked October 9, 2001. Each
envelope contained a letter with statements such as, “09-11-
01…You can not stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now.
Are you afraid?” No B. anthracis–positive powder-containing
envelopes were recovered from other sites in New York City
or during investigations in Florida or Connecticut.
The September 18 envelopes were transported through
various postal facilities along processing and delivery paths
between New Jersey and the intended media company targets
in New York City. The implicated envelopes were processed at
the U.S. Postal Service Trenton Mail Processing and Distribu-
tion Center in Hamilton, New Jersey, and were sent to the
Morgan Central Postal Facility in New York City, where they
were sorted and delivered. Both these facilities and at least
five others in New Jersey affiliated with the Hamilton facility
had environmental samples positive for B. anthracis (21,22).
Despite environmental evidence of B. anthracis spores at two
broadcast media work facilities (ABC, CBS) associated with
case-patients, no other B. anthracis–positive mail was recov-
ered. Although no B. anthracis–positive envelopes were
recovered in Florida, B. anthracis was isolated from environ-
mental sampling at the AMI building (the worksite of the Flor-
ida case-patients) and at least six postal facilities along the
path of mail delivered to AMI. The dates of illness onset in
AMI media company employees in Florida suggest possible
exposure to envelopes mailed in mid-September 2001 (23).
The October 9 envelopes were mailed in or around Tren-
ton, New Jersey, processed at the Hamilton, New Jersey, facil-
ity, and transported to the U.S. Postal Service Brentwood Mail
Processing and Distribution Center in Washington, D.C. The
envelopes were processed with high-speed sorters at both the
Hamilton and Brentwood facilities, allowing for the possibility
of aerosolized B. anthracis spores. The implicated envelopes
Figure 1. Epidemic curve for 22 cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax,
United States, 2001.
Figure 2. Cases of anthrax associated with mailed paths of implicated
envelopes and intended target sites. NY, New York; NBC, National
Broadcasting Company; AMI, American Media Inc.; USPS, United
States Postal Service; CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System. *Enve-
lope addressed to Senator Leahy, found unopened on November 16,
2001, in a barrel of unopened mail sent to Capitol Hill; **dotted line indi-
cates intended path of envelope addressed to Senator Leahy. BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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and other subsequently contaminated mail were transported to
various government mail facilities. One implicated envelope
was delivered to the office of Senator Daschle in the Hart
Senate Office Building and was opened by office staff on
October 15, 2001. Prompt recognition of the potential for
anthrax illness from the powder-containing envelope led to
rapid initiation of postexposure chemoprophylaxis for exposed
office staff. Beginning October 15, nasal swab specimens were
collected from 625 persons potentially exposed at the Hart
Senate building to the envelope sent to Senator Daschle on
October 9; 28 were found to be positive for B. anthracis (24).
Environmental sampling showed that sections of the Hart
Building and the Brentwood postal facility were heavily con-
taminated with B. anthracis spores. In addition, at least 25
other government, postal, or mail-receiving facilities affiliated
with Brentwood had environmental samples positive for B.
anthracis; some of these facilities did not process the impli-
cated envelopes but received other mail from Brentwood. The
other implicated envelope postmarked on October 9, 2001,
was addressed to Senator Leahy and was recovered unopened
on November 16, 2001, in government mail that had been
impounded before delivery to Capitol Hill; the exact delivery
path of this envelope is unknown (25).
Case Clusters
The first cluster of nine cases began approximately 4 days
after the September 18 envelopes were mailed (Figure 1). All
seven cases from New York City and New Jersey in the first
case cluster were cutaneous anthrax; all five New York City
cases included media company employees or visitors. Both
New Jersey cases were in postal employees. The two cases
from Florida were both inhalational anthrax and were in media
company employees. Overall, eight of the nine persons in the
first case cluster were exposed to worksites (postal facilities or
media companies) that had environmental samples positive for
B. anthracis. One case-patient, a New Jersey mail carrier, had
no exposure to any contaminated worksite; exposure to B.
anthracis–positive mail, secondarily contaminated at impli-
cated postal facilities (i.e., cross-contaminated mail), is a
likely source of infection. The median number of days from
the postmark date of September 18, 2001, to onset of illness in
the first case cluster was 10 days (range 4–13 days). Onset of
illness for all cases in the first cluster occurred before the first
culture identification of B. anthracis in the index case of inha-
lational anthrax in Florida on October 3, 2001 (Figure 1). 
The second case cluster began approximately 5 days after
the October 9 envelopes were mailed. All five cases from the
D.C. metropolitan area were in the second case cluster, all
were inhalational anthrax, and all case-patients worked in
postal facilities contaminated by the B. anthracis–containing
October 9 envelopes. The last two cutaneous cases from New
York City whose onsets of illness occurred in the second case
cluster (cases numbered 18 and 20 in Table 1) were known to
have handled the September 18 New York Post envelope when
it was moved in mid-October before its identification. Of the
four cases from New Jersey in the second cluster, two were
inhalational anthrax in postal employees, one was cutaneous
anthrax in a postal worker, and one was cutaneous anthrax in a
bookkeeper who worked at a nearby commercial office build-
ing; all four case-patients were exposed to worksites that had
environmental samples positive for B. anthracis. No definitive
B. anthracis exposure was identified for a case of inhalational
anthrax in a woman who worked in the supply stockroom of a
hospital in Manhattan. Exposure to cross-contaminated mail is
a possible source of her infection. The median number of days
from the postmark date of October 9, 2001, to onset of illness
in the second case cluster was 7 days (range 5–13 days),
excluding case-patients with no defined exposure or with
exposure to the September 18 envelopes. Thus, the median
number of days from mailing of the implicated envelopes to
onset of symptoms was an estimated 3 days less for the second
cluster; however, there was no statistically significant differ-
ence for this comparison.
One case of inhalational anthrax in a 94-year-old female
resident of Oxford, Connecticut, had onset of illness on
November 14, 2001. No exposure to B. anthracis for this
patient could be defined, despite extensive environmental sam-
pling at her home and other sites. Environmental samples at
the U.S. Postal Service Wallingford Mail Processing and Dis-
tribution Center in Wallingford, Connecticut, were positive for
B. anthracis. The Wallingford facility received mail from the
contaminated postal facility in Hamilton, New Jersey, and
served as the primary source of mail delivered to the patient’s
home, suggesting cross-contamination of mail as a possible
source of exposure. Postal sorting records indicated that an
envelope had been processed in Hamilton on a high-speed
sorter 15 seconds after one of the implicated envelopes sent to
U.S. senators. That envelope had been delivered to an address
4 miles away from the residence of the Connecticut patient.
The envelope was recovered and found to be positive for B.
anthracis. 
We classified cases on the basis of known or likely expo-
sure to contaminated envelopes, accounting for the location,
occupation, and estimated incubation period of the case (Table
2). Eleven cases were associated with the September 18 enve-
lopes (case numbers 1–9, 18, and 20; Table 1). Eight cases
were associated with the October 9 envelopes (case numbers
10–16, and 19; Table 1). No certain exposure to any implicated
envelopes was found for three cases (case numbers 17, 21, and
22; Table 1). Case number 5, a New Jersey mail carrier, had no
exposure to the Hamilton facility or any B. anthracis–positive
worksites; however, we classified this case with the September
18 mailing because onset of illness occurred before the Octo-
ber 9 mailing. When we excluded from analysis the three
patients who had no definitive exposures, we found that case-
patients associated with the September 18 envelopes were
more likely to have been exposed at news media facilities than
at postal facilities compared with patients associated with the
October 9 envelopes (OR undefined, p<0.01). Cases associ-
ated with the October 9 envelopes were more likely to be inha-Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1025
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lational anthrax than were those associated with the September
18 envelopes (OR 31.5; 95% CI 1.76% to 1,570%; p<0.01).
These findings suggest that the October 9 mailing was
associated with more severe illness and with development of
illness following exposures along the path of the mail.
Interventions
Antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis was recom-
mended for persons at risk for inhalational anthrax given 1) the
presence of an inhalational case at a facility (e.g., AMI in Flor-
ida), 2) environmental specimens positive for B. anthracis in
facilities along the path of a contaminated letter where aero-
solization might have occurred (e.g., postal facilities in New
York City, New Jersey, Connecticut, District of Columbia, and
Virginia), and 3) exposure to an air space known to be contam-
inated with aerosolized B. anthracis from an opened letter
(e.g., Senate office buildings in the District of Columbia)
(26,27). An estimated 32,000 persons initiated antimicrobial
prophylaxis; however, completion of a 60-day course of anti-
microbial prophylaxis was recommended for approximately
10,300 persons who met the factors listed above (26–28).
Because some persons requested additional precautions, espe-
cially those exposed to high levels of anthrax spores, more
antibiotics—alone or with vaccine—were offered to other per-
sons in the same cohort (29). No additional cases of anthrax
have been reported in persons at sites where B. anthracis
exposures were suspected and where exposed persons initiated
antimicrobial prophylaxis. Additional description of antimi-
crobial postexposure prophylaxis is presented elsewhere (30–
32).
Discussion
We identified 22 cases of anthrax that occurred after enve-
lopes containing B. anthracis–positive powder were mailed to
persons in news media and government. Inhalational and cuta-
neous disease followed exposure to B. anthracis spores; five
people died. These cases represent the first reported bioterror-
ism-related outbreak of anthrax. The investigation of these
cases reveals important findings for detecting and preventing
infections from bioterrorist attacks.
We tested B. anthracis isolates from patients, powder-con-
taining envelopes, and environmental samples from news
media, government, and postal processing worksites and found
all tested isolates to be indistinguishable by molecular typing
methods. Similar U.S. postal service-issue envelopes contain-
ing powder preparations of these B. anthracis spores were
mailed from the Trenton, New Jersey, area on at least two
dates. Although isolates, envelopes, and originating postal
paths were similar, characteristics of cases differed by date of
mailing and geographic region.
Patients in the cluster that occurred after the September 18
mailing were more likely to have cutaneous disease and to
have been exposed at news media facilities rather than at
postal facilities. Case-patients in the cluster that occurred after
the October 9 mailing were more likely to have inhalational
disease and to have been exposed at postal facilities along the
path of envelopes sent to U.S. senators. Postal workers
exposed to B. anthracis from the October mailings had pre-
dominantly inhalational disease. The case-fatality ratio for all
cases of inhalational anthrax was 45%, a ratio lower than pre-
viously reported (33); the estimated incubation period of 4.5
days for inhalational cases was consistent with previously
reported findings (1). 
The fulminant systemic illness associated with the October
mailing to U.S. senators differed greatly from the less severe
cutaneous cases in media company employees in New York
City, suggesting that substantial illness and death likely might
have occurred among senate office staff after implicated enve-
lopes were opened. Exposure to B. anthracis spores from pro-
cessing unopened envelopes at the Hamilton and Brentwood
postal facilities went unrecognized until after the implicated
envelope was opened at the Hart Senate Office Building.
Administration of postexposure chemoprophylaxis likely pre-
vented further cases in postal workers and almost certainly
averted disease in senate staff. Estimates derived from mathe-
matical models support this conclusion (34). Our findings sug-
gest that prompt use of antimicrobial prophylaxis following
suspected bioterrorist attacks can prevent disease.
Differences in the consistency of B. anthracis powders
between the September and October mailings have been
reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and may
account for the preponderance of inhalational cases in the sec-
ond cluster (35,36). The later mailings may have intentionally
contained a smaller particle-sized powder to produce greater
harm. Media company employees had less severe disease than
did the postal workers along the path of envelopes sent to
senators. 
Our findings indicate that the clinical and epidemiologic
presentations of a bioterrorist attack depend on the population
targeted, the characteristics of the agent, and the mode of
transmission. With naturally occurring outbreaks of infection,
early cases identified often provide clues to the mode and
source of exposure. For bioterrorism-related disease, charac-
teristics of initial cases may be misleading if terrorists vary the
mode and source of exposure. Further understanding is needed
of the role of different B. anthracis powder formulations in the
mode of exposure and illness characteristics of persons
exposed. 
Cases of anthrax occurred in persons near those targeted
for infection and also in those along the mail path of spore-con-
taining envelopes. After the mailing of the September 18 enve-
lopes, cases of cutaneous anthrax occurred, but were initially
unrecognized, in workers at the postal processing center in
New Jersey where the implicated envelopes originated. After
the mailing of the October 9 envelopes, inhalational disease
was identified in workers at postal facilities in the District of
Columbia and New Jersey. Investigators did not anticipate the
exposures and fulminant disease in those exposed to aerosols
of B. anthracis spores from unopened envelopes along the path
of the mail. No prior experience with mailed B. anthracis–pos-BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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itive, powder-containing envelopes is described in published
reports; previous descriptions of aerosolized B. anthracis
spores indicated that risk for re-aerosolization or resuspension
of spores was low (37). Previous preventive strategies for pre-
sumed B. anthracis exposures now appear inadequate in light
of recent findings. Before this incident, antimicrobial prophy-
laxis was recommended only for direct exposures to the enve-
lopes, and limited decontamination was suggested only for the
immediate site of envelope opening (38). Cutaneous and inha-
lational disease in postal workers in our investigation clearly
shows that sealed, B. anthracis–positive, powder-containing
envelopes can be a source of infection, presumably via the air-
borne route, for persons processing contaminated mail in
postal facilities. Airborne transmission at the Brentwood and
Hamilton facilities may have been facilitated by the use of
high-speed sorters, as well as air-blowers used for routine
cleaning (12). Any future investigations of bioterrorism-related
anthrax should evaluate persons potentially exposed along the
path of the delivery vehicle as well as those targeted by the
attack.
We found most cases of anthrax to be epidemiologically
linked to sites contaminated by implicated envelopes; how-
ever, not all cases had direct exposures to targeted worksites,
implicated envelopes, or mail-processing facilities along the
mail path. Two cutaneous anthrax patients, a mail carrier and a
bookkeeper in New Jersey, were not exposed to contaminated
postal facilities or media companies. Only one of many envi-
ronmental samples of surfaces at the bookkeeper’s office,
where mail was received, was positive for B. anthracis. Cross-
contaminated mail may be a likely exposure source for anthrax
for both these cases. 
The possibility of B. anthracis exposure from envelopes
secondarily contaminated from implicated postal facilities
greatly extended the group of potentially exposed persons in
our investigation. Experience with anthrax related to agricul-
tural or industrial sources indicated that direct exposure to ani-
mals, animal products, and wool-processing facilities
accounted for most reported cases (1,3,4,39). Contamination
of the environment in animal and wool-processing facilities
has been shown, and occasional cases due to secondarily con-
taminated items have been reported as a possible source of
anthrax (1).
For our investigation, contamination found at postal pro-
cessing facilities off the direct mail path of implicated enve-
lopes indicates that cross-contamination of mail occurred;
however, enhanced surveillance for anthrax cases in multiple
regions has not identified additional cases. Two patients with
inhalational anthrax, a hospital worker in New York City and a
retired woman in Connecticut, had no exposure to media or
government worksites, implicated postal facilities, or possible
sources of naturally occurring anthrax (40). Neither patient
had evidence of B. anthracis contamination at her home (or
workplace for the New York City case), yet both were infected
with B. anthracis isolates indistinguishable from the outbreak
strain. Postal processing facilities in New York City and Wall-
ingford, Connecticut, were contaminated with B. anthracis,
suggesting cross-contaminated mail as a possible source of B.
anthracis exposure for both cases. 
From our investigation, B. anthracis–positive powder
appears capable of contaminating other mail during process-
ing, leading to exposure and subsequent development of cuta-
neous and possibly inhalational anthrax. The risk from cross-
contaminated mail appears to be extremely low; 85 million
pieces of mail were processed at facilities in New Jersey and
District of Columbia after the October 9 envelopes, and no
additional anthrax cases were detected through stimulated
enhanced hospital-based surveillance of 10.5 million people in
metropolitan areas around those postal facilities (41).
Although the risk for B. anthracis infection from cross-con-
taminated mail may be low, investigations of future bioterror-
ist attacks with B. anthracis–positive powders should consider
the potential role of secondarily contaminated items in trans-
mission of disease. An attack using a greater number of spore-
containing envelopes would likely lead to many more cases
due to cross-contaminated mail (42).
Throughout the investigation, various reporting mecha-
nisms were used to enhance detection of cases, including pro-
spective syndromic surveillance in emergency departments
and intensive-care units, laboratory-based surveillance, net-
works of clinicians such as dermatologists, and worksite
absenteeism monitoring. In general, most cases of anthrax
were detected through reports from clinical laboratorians and
clinicians and from patient self-reporting. The role of the news
media in increasing patient, clinician, and laboratorian aware-
ness of anthrax was likely an important factor in stimulating
case detection and reporting. Health departments sent alerts to
health-care providers and provided training seminars for clini-
cians to improve case detection. Before the bioterrorism-
related anthrax cases in 2001, clinician recognition of clinical
findings suggestive of cutaneous or inhalational anthrax is pre-
sumed to have been very low (43,44). For our investigation,
cases in the first cluster associated with the September 18
mailing went unrecognized until B. anthracis was identified in
a culture of cerebrospinal fluid from the index case in Florida,
underscoring the critical role of the laboratory in initiating the
investigation. 
These first unrecognized cutaneous cases demonstrate the
potential difficulties in detecting cases from a covert bioterror-
ism agent release. Once the possibility of anthrax exposures at
media companies was recognized, along with subsequent envi-
ronmental work site samples positive for B. anthracis, cases of
cutaneous anthrax were more readily detected and reported.
During the investigation, rapid dissemination of clinical find-
ings through broadcast e-mail and fax alerts to hospitals and
providers, public health reports, and networks of clinical, labo-
ratory, and public health officials provided important tools to
frontline clinicians to improve recognition of anthrax. Enhanc-
ing the knowledge and skills of clinicians and laboratorians for
diagnosing bioterrorism-related infections and improving col-
laborations between clinicians and public health practitionersEmerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1027
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will set the stage for better detection of cases associated with
any future acts of bioterrorism.
Our investigation had several limitations. The detection of
anthrax cases involved numerous local, state, and federal pub-
lic health and law enforcement officials. Because of the widely
distributed activities of various investigators and the need to
act quickly in identifying potential exposure sources, data col-
lection instruments were not uniform. Collation of information
across sites was limited to a select set of demographic, expo-
sure, and risk factor data elements. The wide use of postexpo-
sure prophylaxis, along with difficulty in obtaining detailed
information about potentially exposed persons, prevented gen-
eral estimates of anthrax attack rates for many sites. Surveil-
lance case definitions required laboratory confirmation of
disease or of environmental exposure and thus may have
missed cases of disease that were treated empirically without
appropriate cultures (e.g., illness empirically treated as
infected spider bites, which was actually cutaneous anthrax).
Environmental sampling of potentially contaminated facilities
used different testing methods; because less sensitive testing
methods were used, certain sites may have underrepresented
the degree of contamination. Throughout the investigation,
there was a continuing need to refine study methods and rede-
termine intervention recommendations, since prior experience
with bioterrorism-related anthrax was lacking. Finally,
because the public health investigation was also a criminal
investigation, information that may have contributed epidemi-
ologic information may not have been available to many pub-
lic health investigators because it was protected for use in
prosecution. 
The attacks initiated response activities in all states across
the United States and in other countries and required consider-
able resources to support investigative efforts at the local,
state, and federal levels. The perpetrator has not been appre-
hended, and new cases can still occur. Continued collaboration
with law enforcement officials is required, and clinicians, lab-
oratorians, public health officials, and the general public
should remain alert for patient symptoms or findings that
might indicate additional cases of bioterrorism-related anthrax.
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